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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have improved the
quality of several non-safety related products in the past years.
However, before DNNs should be deployed to safety-critical
applications, their robustness needs to be systematically analyzed.
A common challenge for DNNs occurs when input is dissimilar to
the training set, which might lead to high confidence predictions
despite proper knowledge of the input.
Several previous studies have proposed to complement DNNs
with a supervisor that detects when inputs are outside the scope
of the network. Most of these supervisors, however, are developed
and tested for a selected scenario using a specific performance
metric. In this work, we emphasize the need to assess and
compare the performance of supervisors in a structured way.
We present a framework constituted by four datasets organized
in six test cases combined with seven evaluation metrics.
The test cases provide varying complexity and include data
from publicly available sources as well as a novel dataset
consisting of images from simulated driving scenarios. The latter
we plan to make publicly available. Our framework can be used
to support DNN supervisor evaluation, which in turn could be
used to motive development, validation, and deployment of DNNs
in safety-critical applications.
Index Terms—deep neural networks, robustness, out-of-
distribution, supervisor, automotive perception
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning (DL) has produced groundbreaking results
in recent years. Building on the increasing availability of data
and massive parallel processing power, DL has revolution-
ized research topics such as computer vision [1], machine
translation [2], and voice recognition [3]. However, while DL
can achieve accuracy beyond human capabilities for specific
tasks [4], it is not yet clear how development organizations
should systematically approach testing of DL-based systems.
Since DL testing in a structured way is an open challenge
similar to the broader concept of Machine Learning (ML)
Verification & Validation (V&V) [5], DL-enabled systems are
currently mostly deployed in non-critical application domains.
Using DL to place online advertisements to maximize con-
version rates in e-commerce introduces limited risks, similar
to using DL in smart-phone augmented reality apps to amuse
users. But what about safety-critical applications for which
human health, the environment, or large financial assets are at
stake?
A. Problem Domain and Motivation
The limited transparency of DL is one of the major impedi-
ments of using DL in domains that require a systematic safety
certification. From the perspective of the safety standard used
for automotive software (ISO 262621), using DL introduces
a major paradigm shift compared to conventional software
systems [6]–[8]. Safety certification requires a convincing
argument, which is structured in a safety case to outline
why a system is safe [9]. Instead of human-readable source
code, state-of-the-art DL might be composed of hundreds
of millions of unexplainable parameter weights, necessitating
novel approaches for V&V to evolve for DL [5]. Thus, several
techniques mandated by ISO 26262 cannot be directly applied
to DL, e.g., source code reviews and exhaustive coverage
testing, which aim at increasing function readability or main-
tainability that is less relevant for Neural Networks (NN) in
general and Deep Neural Networks (DNN) in particular. To
achieve convincing argumentation of safety for DL enabled
systems, we believe some form of run-time NN supervision is
required.
We envision a DL supervisor that continuously performs
novelty detection [10] during run-time to detect when input
does not resemble the training data. Upon such a detection the
supervisor should re-direct the software execution to a safe-
track, which should be implemented without ML to offer a
graceful degradation. This is a common safety engineering
concept [11] that has been proposed also for NN-based control
system [12]. Moreover, the safe track could be targeted by
conventional approaches to safety-critical software engineering
and can thus obtain safety certification.
B. Research Goal and Research Questions
There is currently no established framework for how to sys-
tematically evaluate DL supervisors. Hence, we cannot draw
firm conclusions on which DL supervisor is most appropriate.
Even worse, without a structured approach for testing, we
1Note that the current paper was written before ISO/PAS 21448 Road
vehicles – Safety of the intended functionality was published in January 2019.
Any future work on the topic of ML and automotive safety should consider
the new standard as a point of reference.
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cannot conclude whether any DL supervisors yield promising
results at all. As such, the goal of this work is to develop such
a framework. Based on these observations, we formulate the
following research question to guide our work.
• RQ: How could the evaluation of different DL supervisors
be supported?
C. Contributions
We present an evaluation framework for DL supervisors.
Our approach has three fundamental components: (i) definition
of metrics, and (ii) test case setups; in addition, (iii) we
show how to use the evaluation method on two test cases by
developing two supervisors. The first supervisor shows how
to only utilize the softmax output of a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) classifier [13] for anomaly detection, whereas
the second one uses a variational autoencoder [14] for the same
purpose.
D. Scope and Limitations
In our work, we consider primarily two example supervi-
sors for illustrations: A softmax threshold technique and a
variational autoencoder. These examples demonstrate certain
aspects of DL for (i) non-safety-critical applications, and
(ii) examples from a self-driving vehicular application where
the supervisor is used to obtain awareness of novel traffic
scenarios. While we demonstrate different supervisors applied
on different test cases to show transferability of our ideas, we
are not yet claiming generalizability towards having another
instrument ready to be used within safety case argumentation
in the context of ISO 26262 for example.
E. Structure of the Article
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
presents related work on DL testing and DL supervisors.
Section III describes our approach to structured evaluation,
Section IV presents two example applications of the evaluation
method. In Section V, we discuss the practical implications of
our work, both for research and practice. Finally, Section VI
concludes our work and outlines directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The area of testing DL-based approaches and NN has gained
a lot of attention recently to improve the way to evaluate
performance and robustness. One goal of the testing is to allow
DL-based approaches in areas that are typically very sensitive
to changes in the input data or where unexpected behaviour or
wrong decisions can have severe consequences. Recent studies
like DeepXplore from Fei et al. [15] or its extension DLFuzz
from Guo et al. [16] aim at measuring and improving neuron
coverage. Such approaches look at a resulting NN in general
to find or generate test data for cases that have not been
covered from the test dataset; reported improvements are in
the range of around 2-3%. While these approaches look at the
NN itself, our goal is to detect unwanted behaviour based on
the input and an NN’s output data to enable the design of
appropriate supervisors. Kim et al. [17] propose an approach
that evaluates the way a given input from the training data
is influencing the behaviour of the NN, to guide testers to
select test data resulting in a certain surprise in an NN as an
adequacy criterion.
Ma et al. [18] propose DeepGauge, a set of multi-granularity
testing criteria for DL systems, which aims at rendering a
multi-faceted portrayal of the testbed. Experimental results
show that DeepGauge may be a useful tool for evaluating
testing adequacy of NNs.
Another approach to achieve robustness of an NN-based
system is to monitor the performance online. For example,
Hendrycks and Gimpel [19] presented a method looking at
the softmax layer of the NN as a prediction probability.
They tested with several datasets and show promising results
with respect to predicting whether the trained classifier will
correctly classify a test example or not, and also to determine
whether the test example is in- or out-of-distribution of the
training data.
Liang et al. [20] propose ODIN, an out-of-distribution
detector for neural networks that does not require any change
to a pre-trained model. The method is based on the observation
that using temperature scaling and adding small perturbations
to the input can separate the softmax score distributions of in-
and out-of-distribution samples, allowing for more effective
detection of unwanted behaviour.
Englund and Verikas [12] propose to monitor the error
between the predicted output and the measured output of an
industrial process to switch between a NN-based controller
and a traditional integrating controller. It was experimentally
shown that when the direct model had difficulties to predict
the process output, also the inverse model had difficulties to
predict the control signal and hence, a safe track consisting of
an integrating process controller was used to bring the process
back to the desired output range.
Another supervisor approach was proposed by Tranheden
and Landgren [21]. The supervisor monitored activations from
all layers of the NN and not only the softmax layer as in [19].
Their conclusion is that the information, which is contained
in the different layers of the NN, and how it is represented
therein, varies with both network and the problem at hand,
and therefore NN-specific supervisors may be needed.
III. EVALUATION METHOD
In this section we describe our proposed framework for
comparing supervisors. To achieve fair comparison between
different methods, they must be compared on common
grounds. Differences in setups will affect the performance of
the supervisors and also render it impossible to benchmark
different supervisors with each other. To reduce the impact of
these differences we propose a fixed set of datasets, metrics,
and requirements for models under supervision. In the rest of
the section, we describe all parts starting with the datasets that
we used for experimentation.
Datasets: Our framework considers four dataset combina-
tions, which together represent six inlier/outlier cases as can
be seen in Tab. I. All datasets are partitioned in inliers/outliers,
Fig. 1. Example images of the training data of MNIST handwritten digits
(above) and the outlier samples from Omniglot (below).
Fig. 2. Example images of the training set of CIFAR-10 (above), and outlier
samples from the Tiny ImageNet set (below).
where the training data from the inlier set is used to train the
model and the test data from the inlier set in combination with
the outlier data is used to evaluate the supervisor performance.
The first dataset combination: MNIST/Omniglot aims at intro-
ducing a simple case to illustrate the possibility of supervision
for simple scenarios. The training data is distributed with
train/test setup, and is used as is. For the corresponding
outlier data we choose an equal amount of samples as the test
data from the Omniglot dataset [22] which consists of 1,623
handwritten characters from over 50 alphabets. The omniglot
images are rescaled to fit the dimension of the MNIST images.
Example images of these datasets can be seen in Fig. 1.
The second combination is RGB-data from CIFAR-10 [23]
and Tiny ImageNet (a subset from the ImageNet Large Scale
Visual Recognition Challenge [24]). These datasets contain
small sized images, where the object in focus is covering the
majority of the image as can be seen in Fig. 2 and hence,
background information from the images will have less impact
on the supervisor. The CIFAR-10 data comes pre-distributed
in train and test data, which is also used as is. The outlier
samples are selected as the test data from Tiny ImageNet, but
resized to match the CIFAR-10 image size.
The third dataset is created from a simulator as an in-
troduction to more realistic data for self-driving vehicular
applications. The dataset consists of realistic driving scenarios
that are simulated in the virtual prototyping platform Pro-
SiVICTM from ESI2. Pro-SiVICTM allows us to simulate
2https://www.esi-group.com/software-solutions/virtual-environment/virtual-
systems-controls/esi-pro-sivictm-3d-simulations-environments-and-sensors
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA USED FOR EACH OF THE TEST CASES. FOR
THE PRO-SIVIC CASES, THE TRAINING SET CONSIST OF HIGHWAY
IMAGES, AND OUTLIERS ARE REPRESENTED BY FOGGY OR URBAN
SCENARIOS. FOR DR(EYE)VE THE TRAINING SET CONSIST OF DAYLIGHT
DRIVING WITHOUT RAIN, AND THE OUTLIER SET IS REPRESENTED BY
NIGHT DRIVING OR RAIN.
Case Trainingsamples
Test
samples
Outlier
samples
Original
dimension
MNIST/Omniglot 60,000 10,000 10,000 (28x28)
CIFAR-10/
Tiny ImageNet 50,000 10,000 10,000 (32x32)
Pro-SiVIC Highway
Sunny/Foggy 7,629 788 787 (752x480)
Pro-SiVIC Highway/
Urban 7,629 788 488 (752x480)
DR(eye)VE Night 120,000 127,500 75,000 (1920x1080)
DR(eye)VE Rain 120,000 127,500 60,000 (1920x1080)
Fig. 3. Example images from the DR(eye)VE dataset: (left) image from the
inlier set, including sunny roads, followed by two outlier samples of rain
(middle) and night driving (right).
different environments, weather conditions, vehicle types, and
sensor setups. The outputs considered here are from a camera
sensor attached to the vehicles. Pro-SiVICTM also provides
pixel by pixel semantic segmentation of the images. For our
framework, we have defined the following driving scenarios:
As autonomous highway pilots might be one of the first fully
self-driving solutions, we have around 7,500 images from
driving on a highway during sunny weather as our inlier data.
The outlier data consists of scenarios including driving in
foggy conditions (around 780 images) and driving in urban
areas (around 480 images). Figs. 7-9 show selected samples
from the inlier and outlier data.
The fourth dataset has data from DR(eye)VE [25], which
consists of images from real life driving. The data is com-
prised of 74 videos with sequences of five minutes each with
annotation of drivers’ gaze fixations. The dataset contains
meta data describing daylight condition, weather, and driving
situation. Using this meta data we partition the dataset into
inlier/outlier with daylight and night-driving/rainy-weather as
in- and outliers respectively, as can be seen in Fig. 3.
Evaluation metrics: In this section we present the metrics
used in our framework. Our proposal is general and does not
rely on any particular implementation details of the supervisors
under study. We only assume that the output of the supervisor
is a single number – the anomaly score, which measures
the similarity of the input data to samples in the training
dataset. In the following, we will refer to an inlier/outlier as
a negative/positive data point.
In our framework, the evaluation of a supervisor is based on
four plots and seven scalar values (metrics) that show different
aspects of the supervisor performance. We present them in the
following and justify their individual value.
The plots consist of 1) the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve. The curve shows how the true/false positive
ratios change when the threshold of the allowed anomaly score
varies. This is used to determine the discriminative capability
of the supervisor with respect to positive/negative examples.
In real-world applications for example, a common problem
exists with skewed or imbalanced data. To better represent
performance in imbalanced datasets, the precision-recall (PR)
curve is more informative than the ROC-curve, and plot 2) is
providing the PR curve [26]. Although the ROC/PR curves
are informative on their own, they only reveal aggregated
information about the distribution of the anomaly scores across
positive and negative data points. Plot 3) is hence the anomaly
score distributions of the supervisor algorithm for the in- and
outlier data, respectively. If the two distributions are clearly
separable, the supervisor can easily distinguish between in-
and outliers.
So far we have only considered the performance of the
supervisor as an anomaly detector and not considered its effect
on the performance of the DL model under supervision. Hence,
we need to incorporate the performance measure of the DL
algorithm in our evaluation process. This is achieved through
4) the risk-coverage curve [27], which shows the trade-off
between prediction failure rate (risk) and amount of covered
data samples. Having this plot we can visualize how the
performance varies as less and less data is accepted by the
supervisor.
By using the plots above, we aim at assessing a supervisor’s
performance from a holistic perspective. However, to compare
different supervisors we need to quantify this information
using comparable metrics. To this end we consider (i) the area
under the ROC- (AUROC) and (ii) PR-curve (AUPRC), re-
spectively, which represent the trade-off between true and false
positives as less and less data is accepted by the supervisor.
The actual shape of the ROC/PR curve is also interesting to
capture, as it is preferable having its shape to be located closely
to the upper left/right corner. To capture this, the third measure
is (iii) true positive rate at 5% false positive rate (TPR05) and
(iv) precision at 95% recall (P95). One desired property of the
supervisor is to assign a low anomaly score to as many outliers
as possible. The opposite behaviour, being over-confident that
an outlier belongs to the inlier dataset, is clearly dangerous for
safety-critical applications. We propose to measure this using
(v) false negative rate at 95% false positive rate (FNR95), or
in other words, how many anomalies are not excluded by the
supervisor when it excludes 95% of the inlier data.
When introducing out-of-distribution samples, the perfor-
mance level is reduced drastically as the output for an outlier
sample is always considered erroneous. This behaviour is
not captured in the metrics derived from the anomaly score
distributions or the ROC/PR curves; it can be visualized,
however, in the risk-coverage curve. It is clearly of interest
to see how restrictive the supervisor has to be to recover the
original performance on the dataset including outlier samples,
or if it is not achievable with the given supervisor. We call this
metric (vi) coverage breakpoint at performance level (CBPL).
Finally, in similar fashion to (v), it is of interest to see if the
supervisor can completely exclude outliers from the data, i.e.,
can we achieve full anomaly detection for some non-trivial
(zero) value of coverage. We call this metric (vii) coverage
breakpoint at full anomaly detection (CBFAD).
Models: For supervisor methods that utilize information
from the DL model under supervision, e.g., from bottlenecks
or output from the final layers of a deep neural network, it
is important to use the same model when comparing results.
Some supervisors can utilize probes inside the network, which
is acceptable as long as all supervisors have access to the
same information. The model under supervision may change
between different use cases, but must remain fixed within a
use case.
IV. EXAMPLE USE CASES
In this section, we give examples of different supervisor im-
plementations and show how our proposed framework applies
to a wide range of applications.
A. Softmax Threshold for CIFAR-10/Tiny ImageNet
In the following, we demonstrate how the information
from a DNN’s final layer can be used as a supervisor. The
assumption is that values from the network’s softmax layer
will carry sufficient information as whether or not the sample
is an outlier. A simple safety cage can be implemented, which
considers the maximum of the predicted class distribution
of the softmax layer of the network as anomaly score [19].
The hypothesis is that samples from an outlier distribution
will have uncertain class results, and thus, there will be no
clear class prediction. Hence we define the anomaly score as
1−maxi(pi), where pi is the softmax output for class i.
To evaluate this supervisor, we use the data in the CIFAR-
10/Tiny ImageNet setup as described in Sec. III. The model
under consideration is a VGG16 [13] network, which has been
trained on CIFAR-10 to achieve 91.9% accuracy. The Tiny
ImageNet dataset contains 200 classes, including some that
also exist in CIFAR-10, such as animals and vehicles. Due
to this overlap, it is expected that anomaly score distributions
for the inlier and outlier data will be overlapping as it can be
seen in Fig. 4. This information is also apparent in the ROC-
curve in Fig. 5. Since the datasets are balanced, it is sufficient
with the ROC-curve, and the PR-curve is excluded. From
Fig. 4, however, we get additional information about where
to focus our efforts to improve the supervisor. Looking at the
distributions we see that if we could eliminate all outliers with
anomaly score less than 0.4, we would be able to improve the
situation significantly. Inspecting the data in that region could
potentially also reveal why the current supervisor is failing for
those images.
For this example, the risk in the risk-coverage plot is defined
as 1-accuracy thus showing the risk of mis-classifying an input
sample. As seen in Fig. 6, the risk is monotonically decreasing
with decreasing coverage, which is expected since all outliers
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
anomaly score
0
1
2
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4
Inlier
Outlier
Fig. 4. The anomaly score with CIFAR-10 as inlier and Tiny ImageNet as
outlier. The anomaly score is represented as 1−maxi(pi), where pi is the
soft-max output for class i from a VGG16 neural network.
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Fig. 5. The ROC curve corresponding to the anomaly score distributions in
Fig. 4, with AUC 0.857 for the CIFAR 10/Tiny ImageNet case.
are mis-classified per definition. One interesting thing to note
is that there is non-zero risk for zero coverage, which means
that the model is making erroneous classifications for data
points with the lowest anomaly score. Hence the maximum
softmax prediction does not reflect the true correctness like-
lihood meaning that the network is badly conditioned [28].
This indicates that using this particular anomaly score and
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Fig. 6. The Risk-Coverage plot corresponding to the anomaly score distribu-
tions in Fig. 4
Fig. 7. Image samples from the inlier set for the realistic drive scenarios
generated from ESI Pro-SiVICTM. The inlier data represent highway driving
in sunny weather conditions.
Fig. 8. Image samples from the first outlier set for the realistic drive scenarios
generated from ESI Pro-SiVICTM. Here, the outliers represent high way
driving in foggy weather conditions.
supervisor for this network might not be optimal. This is very
useful information that we would have missed if just looking
at AUROC as the performance metric for example. The values
of all evaluation metrics are given in Tab. II.
B. Variational Auto Encoder as Supervisor for Realistic Drive
Data
In this section, a Variational Auto Encoder (VAE) is used
as a safety cage for detecting anomalies in realistic driving
scenarios. The data is described in Sec. III with all images
down-scaled to 320 × 192 × 3. Samples of the inlier images
can be seen in Fig. 7 and is represented by highway scenarios
in sunny weather. The inlier set contains 8,413 training and
787 test images. To evaluate the supervisor we use two sets of
anomalies. The first set contains the same images as in the test
set, but with fog overlaid as depicted in Fig. 8. The second set
of anomalies contain 488 images from typical urban scenarios
which can be seen in Fig. 9.
This use case represents the scenario, where the supervisor
has access only to the input data to the perception layer of e.g.,
an autonomous vehicle decision-and-control pipeline. Thus,
Fig. 9. Image samples from the second outlier set for the realistic drive
scenarios generated from ESI Pro-SiVICTM. Here, the outliers represent city
driving in urban scenarios.
Fig. 10. The distribution of the anomaly score for the inlier (high way) and
outlier (fog) data. The inset shows the corresponding ROC curve with AUC
= 1.
we have no access to the softmax output from an image
classifier as was used for anomaly score in the example before.
Instead, we use a VAE as anomaly detector [29]. After training,
a VAE can be used both as a generative model to create new
images that are representative of the training data, and also to
give a lower bound of the log likelihood [14] of a given image
under the model. Here, we use this lower bound as an anomaly
score (the negative of the log likelihood, NLL) for each input
image and test the supervisor with the metrics presented in
Sec. III. Note that since we have no access to the output of
any detection or classification algorithm, we can not gauge
how the supervisor would effect e.g., accuracy; hence, there is
no need to consider the metrics related to risk and coverage.
In this case, the supervisor can be tested using the anomaly
score distribution, ROC curve and corresponding metrics only.
In Fig. 10 we show the distributions of the highway and foggy
highway scenarios, respectively, with the inset showing the
ROC curve. For this type of anomaly the supervisor shows a
performance of AUROC/AUPR = 1 and thus produces perfect
output.
We subject the same trained VAE as was used to detect
foggy images with the urban scenarios as anomalies. In Fig. 11
we show the distributions of the in- and outlier data, again
with the inset showing the ROC curve. Note that the same
supervisor shows a performance of AUROC/AUPR = 1 for
this type of anomaly as well. However, from the distribution
plots it is apparent that the urban scenarios represent a more
difficult set of outliers than the foggy weather condition, which
is information that is lost in the aggregated data represented
by the ROC curve. This is a clear illustration of the usefulness
of having more than one single measure of performance. The
values of all evaluation metrics is given in Tab. II.
V. DISCUSSION
It is understood that explainability is lacking for DL-enabled
systems. When exposed to out-of-distribution samples, the
behaviour can be unpredictable, which requires safe argumen-
tation of DL before deployment. Our framework defines how
a comparison between supervisors can be used as one input
Fig. 11. The distribution of the anomaly score for the inlier (high way)
and outlier (urban) data. The inset shows the corresponding ROC curve with
AUROC = 1. Comparing the separation of in- and outlier distributions with
that in Fig. 10, it is clear that the urban scenarios represent a more difficult
type of anomaly for this safety cage compared with the foggy scenarios.
for an argumentation of a safe development. Our hypothesis is
that information from the training set, as well as characteristics
from the NN can be used to limit the number of erroneous pre-
dictions that will occur if the environment undergoes changes
that makes it different from the training time.
The test cases proposed in this paper consist of a mix
with public well-known datasets, which frequently appear in
DL literature and hence, should be a valid target for DL
supervisor research. These cases can be extended further to
cover additional datasets, which are relevant for a particular
application. As an example, this paper covers cases geared
towards self-driving vehicular applications with the addition
of realistic driving data and thereby demonstrating the trans-
ferability of the approach to datasets with different structure
and complexity.
We are not covering how to design supervisors in this
paper. They can be designed to use either network parameters,
training data, or both, as long as bias from the outlier set
is not introduced in the supervisors. Whether or not network
training details such as overfitting, batch normalization, drop
out, etc. are affecting the ability to supervise the model is
also not covered. This could possibly yield additional insight
of how to establish safe argumentation for DL deployment.
Another aspect to consider is to base the supervisor on deep
learning itself. It introduces, however, an interesting catch-22
logic: If the DL component is supervised by another DL com-
ponent, has anything been gained from a safety perspective?
On the other hand, introducing redundancy, e.g., two indepen-
dently implemented components providing similar functional-
ity, is a common technique in safety engineering [30]. As for
now, we suggest that all options should be explored further to
better understand the limitations of supervisors for DL-enabled
systems.
Finally, all of the proposed datasets and supervisors work
as feed forward networks i.e., no recursiveness or memory is
considered. The images in the realistic driving datasets consist
of time series data, which would allow usage of historical
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION METRICS FOR THE EXAMPLE USE CASES IN SEC. IV. NOTE THAT THERE IS NO PERFORMANCE BASELINE FOR THE VAE
SUPERVISOR AND HENCE CPBL BECOMES N/A IN THIS CASE.
Test setup Metrics
Supervisor Case AUROC AUPRC TPR05 P95 FNR95 CBPL CBFAD
Softmax threshold CIFAR10 / Tiny ImageNet 0.857 0.836 0.284 0.623 0.0022 0.2264 0
Variational Autoencoder Pro-SiVIC Highway Sunny/Foggy 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0.5
Variational Autoencoder Pro-SiVIC Highway/Urban 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0.62
information to increase performance of the supervisor.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, an evaluation framework for deep neural
network supervisors is described. Our framework defines the
evaluation metrics and proposes test cases to enable compari-
son between supervisors. In addition, we show how to apply
two supervisors to two example use cases exhibiting different
complexity.
The outcome of our work opens several directions for future
work. First, our approach will pave the way for systematic
comparisons of different supervisors. Our plan is to pursue
such comparative work next, initially with supervisors men-
tioned in Sec. II. From this comparison, the characteristics that
define a good supervisor can be derived and used to synthesize
an improved version.
Second, the evaluation approach is modular in the sense that
additional supervisors, as well as other types of DL tests can
be added or integrated. Furthermore, a selection of test cases
can be used for task specific solutions since some cases can
be irrelevant for others. In future work, we plan to develop
guidelines for how to best choose between the test cases
provided in our framework.
Third, we believe that supervisor evaluation using a state-
of-the-art simulator is a feasible target for metamorphic test-
ing [31]. By using a simulator, we can generate data adhering
to metamorphic relations such as different weather conditions,
alternative camera positions or small image transformations.
For some metamorphic relations we know that a supervisor
should yield the same results, e.g., changing the color of
surrounding traffic should not be considered as novel situation.
On the other hand, depending on how the normal operating
conditions are defined, adding heavy fog or changing from
paved roads to gravel roads could be used to test if the
supervisor triggers. We believe our approach to supervisor
testing is scalable, and more controllable than using GANs
to generate images, for which metamorphic relations hold as
implemented in DeepRoad [32].
Finally, in one of our research projects3, we are developing
a safety case relying on a supervisor, also known as a safety
cage architecture [33]–[35]. This supervisor will be evaluated
with the approach described in this paper.
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